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Abstract
This paper deals with Tarski’s 0rst axiomatic presentations of the syntax of deductive system.
Andrzej Grzegorczyk’s signi0cant results which laid the foundations for the formalization of
metalogic, are touched upon brie4y. The results relate to Tarski’s theory of concatenation, also
called the theory of strings, and to Tarski’s ideas on the formalization of metamathematics.
There is a short mention of author’s research in the 0eld. The main part of the paper surveys
research on the theory of deductive systems initiated by Tarski, in particular research on (i)
the axiomatization of the general notion of consequence operation, (ii) axiom systems for the
theories of classic consequence and for some equivalent theories, and (iii) axiom systems for
the theories of nonclassic consequence.
In this paper the results of Jerzy S lupecki’s research are taken into account, and also the
author’s and other people belonging to his circle of scienti0c research. Particular study is
made of his dual characterization of deductive systems, both as systems in regard to acceptance
(determined by the usual consequence operation) and systems in regard to rejection
(determined by the so-called rejection consequence). Comparison is made, therefore, with ax-
iomatizations of the theories of rejection and dual consequence, and the theory of the usual
consequence operation.
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1. On axiom systems for written-sign theory and formalizations of metalogic
1.1. Tarski’s contribution
One of the important tasks of the theory of deductive systems, of metalogic, and=or
metamathematics is its formalization in the spirit of Carnap (see [7,8]), as a general
theory of linguistic expressions and, therefore, also suggests a general theory of written
signs. In his original work on the notion of truth Alfred Tarski [31,32] opens the way
for a deductive approach to the foundations of metamathematics, to the syntax and
semantics of deductive systems. Even if he himself applies it only to metamathematics
considered as a metatheory of classes, his approach reveals
• the fundamental ideas of contemporary semantics (satisfaction, truth), and thus,
(i) through an axiomatic concatenation theory for expressions, and
(ii) a formal treatment of recursive grammar, which generates the set of propositions
of the class calculus language considered by Tarski, this approach also shows
• the fundamental ideas of the formalization—within metalogic—of the object language
syntax of an arbitrary deductive system.
Tarski [31] does not formalize metamathematics (metalogic), nor the metalanguage of
any deductive system. Nevertheless, he shows a general way towards an axiomatization
of deductive systems at a nonmethodological syntactic level and suggests a method for
de0ning semantic notions. Such a formal theory must properly contain an axiomatic
theory of concatenation that would allow the de0nition of a meaningful expression (e.g.
a proposition) of an object language of an arbitrary system.
This seems to be a proper place to mention the following three facts.
(1) Tarski considered the construction of a universal syntax system rather unfeasible.
When de0ning propositional truth for some system of class calculus and comment-
ing on a general method for de0ning truth, he adopts a well-known convention (T )
that such a notion is expected to satisfy.
(2) However, Tarski did not prove any theorem on the adequacy of truth, i.e. a
theorem that would state that his notion of truth satis0es the convention, that it
hits the target.
(3) Tarski believed that a proof of such a theorem can only be possible within meta-
metamathematics or meta-metalogic (see [31, pp. 47–48]).
In connection with (1)–(3) it seems worthwhile to mention brie4y some results inspired
by Tarski’s ideas and related to the formalization of meta-mathematics.
1.2. Some results related to Tarski’s idea on the formalization of metamathematics
It is generally accepted that the impact of Tarski’s ideas on the formalization of
metamathematics (metalogic) is due not only to their theoretical implications, but
also to their philosophical signi0cance. Among recent research, fundamental results of
Andrzej Grzegorczyk [10,11] fall within this frame. On the one hand, these include
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(A) Grzegorczyk’s axiomatic universal syntax system together with a logic [10],
(i) a system that imitates the universality of the natural language,
(ii) with well established de0nitions of satisfaction and the classical notion of truth
and besides,
(iii) one that allows a proof of its adequacy, as a reconstruction of Tarski’s convention
(T ) (see [31,32]) at the level of metalogic and not, as Tarski conjectured, at the
level of meta-metalogic;
On the other hand, there are
(B) the most recent Grzegorczyk’s research [11] on the notion of decidability of
0rst order theories, a notion de0ned by Grzegorczyk within metalogic. Here metalogic
is seen as a formalized theory of written signs or texts, containing an axiomatized
0rst order theory of linear written sings or texts (at the level of formal syntax of the
object language of the theory considered), while the classical notion of computability
is de0ned within arithmetic.
In Grzegorczyk’s approach both the universal syntax system and metalogic are formal
theories of texts that include two speci0c axioms of Tarski’s concatenation theory;
concatenation is one of the primitive notions in both of them. The included axioms
state associativity and linearity of concatenation. The “quotation mark” operator is an
important primitive notion in the universal syntax system. Using one of the axioms
of this system an expression can be transformed into another expression representing
the name of the former, and then the name of the latter, i.e. the name of the original
expression, and so on. Thus the language of metalogic re4ects the universality of a
natural language and admits representation of an arbitrary expression of the object
language of a 0rst order theory, for which the notions of satisfaction and truth can be
de0ned.
The author of the present paper followed Tarski’s way of formalizing the syntax of
an arbitrary object language of a deductive science, the way based on concatenation
theory and the method of generating propositions of such a language by a generative
grammar, and applied it to the construction of an axiomatic syntax theory for arbitrary
languages generated by a categorial grammar [38,40,41]. Thus the theory is a theory of
arbitrary languages constructed in the spirit of LeKsniewski’s syntactic categories [12,13]
as improved by Ajdukiewicz [1]. It is an extension of the author’s axiomatic theory of
written signs [37–39] a variant of a theory of concrete and abstract words [6], based on
some ideas of Markov [18] and S lupecki. It admits a precise de0nition of a well-formed
expression for an arbitrary language (with operators bounding variables or without such
operators) independently of the speci0c structure (linear or nonlinear) of its expressions,
of the choice of its vocabulary, symbols, notation, caligraphic system, etc. One of the
speci0c features of the formalization of this theory is that it is performed on two
levels. On one level the signs and henceforth also the expressions of the language are
considered to be sign-tokens, i.e. concrete, material objects, while on the other they
are considered to be sign-types, i.e. abstract objects. This theory can be provided with
a semantics [43,44], in particular with such semantic notions as meaning, denotation
and truth, introduced at the level of expressions-types.
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2. General axioms of the consequence theory T
The 0rst attempts at the formalization of the theory of deductive systems (meta-
mathematics) are due to Tarski and his work on the axiomatization of consequence
theory. Even if his paper [29] on general consequence theory, i.e. the theory T was
preceded by his paper presented to the Polish Mathematical Society in 1928, and thus
also preceded by the 0rst paper [30] ever to start the formalization of the methodology
of deductive sciences, the theory T is a fundamental theoretical basis for the formal-
ization of the so-called enriched theory of deductive systems T+, considered in [30]
and containing a characterization of the notion of consequence today known as classic
consequence. Therefore we start the presentation of the basic foundations of Tarski’s
theory of deductive systems with the axiom system of the theory T and its diOerent
versions or extensions. Then we turn to the enriched theory T+ and discuss research
in this area, mainly initiated or inspired by Jerzy S lupecki, who, like Tarski, formed
part of the Warsaw Logic School and actively propagated and developed the ideas of
Tarski and founders of the Logic School.
2.1. Axiom systems for Tarski’s theories
2.1.1. Tarski’s original axiom system
Tarski’s so-called general theory of deductive systems, or general consequence the-
ory, denoted by T , is based on the following primitive notions: the set S of all propo-
sitions of an arbitrary, but 9xed, language and the consequence operation Cn on the
class P(S) of all subsets of the set S, i.e. a function
Cn : P(S) → P(S);
which to any set of propositions X assigns the set CnX of all propositions deducible
from the propositions in X (i.e. the consequences of the propositions in X ).
In the axioms of Tarski’s theory T and of related theories the variables x; y; z; : : : are
assumed to take values in S, while the variables X; Y; Z; : : : take values in P(S).
The original axiom system for T (see [29]) is the following:
A1. card(S)6ℵ0 – denumerability of S,
A2. X ⊆CnX ⊆ S – the consequence Cn is compact,
A3. CnCnX =CnX – the consequence Cn is idempotent,
A4′. CnX =
⋃ {CnY |Y ∈Fin(X )} – the consequence Cn is 0nitistic.
2.1.2. Other axioms for T
Observe that the axiom A4′ is equivalent to the following pair of formulas, which
together can replace it:
A4. X ⊆Y ⇒CnX ⊆CnY – the consequence Cn is monotonic,
A5. CnX ⊆⋃ {CnY |Y ∈Fin(X )}.
Observe that
• The most frequently used axiom system for T consists of the axioms A1–A5.
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Note also that the axioms A3 and A4 can be replaced by the following one:
A3–4. X ⊆CnY &Y ⊆CnZ⇒X ⊆CnZ .
• Thus a simpli0ed axiom system for T consists of the axioms Al, A2, A3–4 and A5.
• The simplest axiom system for T (cf. [28]) consists of the formulas A1, S1 and S2,
where
S1. Cn(S)⊆ S,
S2. X ∪CnX ∪Cn(CnY )⊆Cn(X ∪Y )∩ ⋃ {CnZ |Z ∈Fin(X ∪Y )}.
2.2. Basic de9nitions in T
The primitive notions of the general consequence theory T may be used to de0ne
basic syntactic notions of the theory of deductive systems as follows:
D1. X ∈ Syst⇔CnX ⊆X ,
D2. X ≈Y ⇔CnX =CnY ,
D3. X ∈AxY ⇔X is a computable set & X ⊆Y & X ≈Y ,
D3a. X ∈fAxY ⇔ card(X )¡ℵ0 & X ⊆Y & X ≈Y ,
D4. Y ∈Ax⇔∃X (X ∈AxY ),
D4a. Y ∈fAx⇔∃X (card(X )¡ℵ0 & X ∈AxY ),
D5. X ∈ Indp⇔∀x ∈ X (x =∈Cn(X \{x})),
D5a. x∈ IndpX ⇔ x =∈CnX ,
D6. X ∈Cons⇔CnX = S,
D7. X ∈ Incons⇔CnX = S,
D8. X ∈Comp⇔∀x =∈CnX (X ∪{x}∈ Incons).
The formulas on the left hand side of the de0nitions D1–D8 may be read as follows:
X is a system, X and Y are equivalent sets, X is an axiom system for the set Y; X is
a 0nite axiom system for Y; Y is axiomatizable, Y is 0nitely axiomatizable, X is an
independent set, x is a proposition independent of the set X; X is a consistent set, X
is an inconsistent set, X is a complete set.
One of the fundamental theorems of T is known as
Lindenbaum’s Theorem:
If X ∈Cons and X ∈fAx, then ∃Y (Y ⊇X & Y ∈ Syst ∩Cons∩Comp),
which states that any 0nitely axiomatizable consistent set can be extended to a complete
consistent system.
The proofs of this and some other theorems of the theory T use an additional axiom
that ensures 0nite axiomatizibility of S:
∃x1; x2; : : : ; xn(Cn{x1; x2; : : : ; xn} = S):
It must be mentioned that because of metamathematical applications in other 0elds of
mathematics, Tarski’s axiom A1, which states the (at most) denumerability of S, should
be replaced by another one that would not impose any conditions on the cardinality
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of this set. In the generalizations of the consequence theory T to systems with an
uncountable set of propositions, the axiom A1 may be replaced, by an axiom stating
the existence of a well-ordering relation for S (see [2, Chapter 8, Section 4]). However,
in the sequel we shall retain Tarski’s original axiom A1.
The theory T also admits a useful relativized notion of consequence with respect to
a set A of propositions:
DCnA (consequence with respect to A)
CnAX = Cn(A ∪ X ):
It can be proved that
Metatheorem: The operation CnA satis9es the axioms A1–A5 of the general conse-
quence theory T .
Thus the operation CnA is indeed a consequence operation.
Also a relativized notion of equivalent sets can be de0ned:
D≈A. X ≈A Y ⇔ CnAX = CnAY .
The de0nition of equivalent sets with respect to a set A was used, e.g., in the
statement that the axioms A3 and A4 of T can be replaced by the axiom A3–4.
Indeed, the sets {A3;A4} and {A3–4} are equivalent with respect to the axiom set
A = {A1;A2;A5}.
The theory T can be extended by further de0nitions. In particular, it should be
noted that the consequence operation Cn can be used to de0ne the so-called rejection
function, corresponding to the notion of rejection introduced by Jan  Lukasiewicz in
metalogic. The notion of rejection is strongly related to the notion of dual consequence,
representing a consequence, inverse in a sense to the usual one. The de0nitions of
rejection function and dual consequence will be preceded here by a characterization of
the so-called unit consequence.
2.3. General consequence theory T enriched by de9nitions of unit and dual conse-
quences
2.3.1. Unit consequences
The notion of unit consequence Cn1 is a particular case of the general notion of
consequence Cn. It can be characterized by the axiom A1 assumed in T for the set S
and the following speci0c axiom, which de0nes it as an operation in the class P(S)
(see [35]):
Ax1. Cn1X = {y | ∃x ∈ X (Cn1{y} ⊆ Cn1{x})}.
By Ax1, a proposition y is a unit consequence of the set X if and only if the
unit consequence of y is contained in the unit consequence of a single proposition
in X .
The following two metatheorems hold true:
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M:Th:1: The operation Cn1 satis9es the general axioms A1–A5 of T and the following
conditions:
Cn1(X ∪ Y ) = Cn1X ∪ Cn1Y it is additive;
Cn1∅ = ∅ it is normal;
y ∈ Cn1X ⇒ ∃x ∈ X (y ∈ Cn1{x}) it is a 9nitistic unit operation:
MTh:2: The general axioms A1–A5 of T for Cn together with the additivity of Cn
and the condition Cn∅= ∅ de9ne Cn as a unit consequence (i.e. an operation
satisfying the axiom Ax1).
Using the consequence Cn we can de0ne in T an operation Cn+1:
DC+1n . Cn
+1X = {y | ∃ x∈X (y∈Cn{x})};
since the new operation satis0es Ax1, it is usually called the unit consequence operation
induced by the consequence operation Cn.
The introduction of Cn+1 is justi0ed by the fact that most often a deduction from a
0nite set of propositions can be reduced to a deduction from a single proposition (a
conjunction of the propositions in a 0nite set).
2.3.2. Dual consequence and dual characterizations of deductive systems
The notion of dual consequence is strongly related to the notion of rejection, intro-
duced into logic by  Lukasiewicz (see [14–17]) in relation with an axiomatic method
for characterizing a deductive system both as a system in the usual sense and as a
system with respect to rejection, i.e. a system where some propositions are rejected
on the basis of propositions previously rejected, false or not accepted in the system.
Also S lupecki [22] used the notion of rejection in his continuation of  Lukasiewicz’s
research on saturation (decidability in the sense of  Lukasiewicz, i.e. the so-called
 L-decidability) of deductive systems. The theory of rejected propositions constructed
by the author of this paper in [35] follows S lupecki’s inspiration. Research in this
direction was carried on and developed (see [3,4,24,25,5,42]).
S lupecki [22] generalized the notion of rejection to the rejection function Cn−1,
which he called  Lukasiewicz function and de0ned it within the general consequence
theory T . The de0nition is as follows:
DC−1n . Cn
−1X = {y | ∃ x∈X (x∈Cn{y})};
A proposition belongs to the set Cn−1X—the set of propositions rejected on the ba-
sis of propositions in X if and only if it has a proposition in X among its consequences.
The function Cn−1 is called the rejection consequence induced by the consequence
operation Cn. The name consequence applied to Cn−1 is justi0ed by the following
result of S lupecki:
MTh.3.
(a) Cn−1 satis9es the general axioms A1–A5 of the consequence theory T ,
and moreover,
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(b) Cn−1 is additive and normal,
and therefore according to MTh2
(c) Cn−1 is a unit consequence.
The name rejection consequence given to Cn−1 is related to the following theorem
provable in T with DCn−1:
T1. ∀X (X ⊆Y ⇒CnX ⊆Y )⇒∀X (X ⊆ S\Y ⇒Cn−1X ⊆ S\Y ).
The theorem shows the intuitive meaning of this kind of consequence. Indeed, if the
consequence Cn determines a deductive system as a set closed with respect to some
inference rule, or more generally some rule of logical entailment, i.e. if Cn is the
usual consequence, an infallible consequence which yields true (or accepted as true)
conclusions for true (or accepted as true, respectively) premises, then taking Y to be the
set of true propositions, S\Y is the set of false propositions and by T1, the expressions
rejected on the basis of false propositions (or not accepted as true) are also false
(or not accepted as true, respectively). Thus, if we denote an infallible consequence,
or in other terms a consequence with respect to acceptance by Cn+ and assume that
Cn = Cn+, then this consequence and the corresponding unit consequence Cn+1 yield
true expressions (or accepted as true) when applied to true ones (or accepted as true),
whereas the rejection consequence Cn−1 always yields false expressions when applied
to false premises.
Observe, however, that the starting point could be diOerent and the construction of
a deductive system could be diOerent as well. We might start with a deductive system
closed with respect to rules of logical rejection. In that case it could be determined
by some rejection consequence. If we take for Cn a consequence Cn− (Cn = Cn−),
which for false (rejected) premises yields false (rejected) propositions, then according
to T1, the rejection consequence corresponding to Cn−, i.e. (Cn−)−1, assigns true
expressions (or accepted as true) to true premises (accepted as true, respectively) and
thus is an infallible consequence, a consequence with respect to acceptance, denoted
by Cn+. Hence when a deductive system is built on two levels, both as a system with
respect to acceptance and a system with respect to rejection, it can be characterized
by the following triple:
(+;−1) 〈S; Cn+; Cn−1〉 or
(+1;−1) 〈S; Cn+1; Cn−1〉,
or inversely; by a triple
(−;+) 〈S; Cn−; Cn+〉.
Thus Tarski’s theory T , enriched by the de0nition of rejection consequence, can be
seen as a generalized consequence theory providing a two-sided characterization of
deductive systems by using one of the two sets of dual notions: (+;−) or (−;+). There
is still another reason for the duality of these notions. Due to DCn−1, the following
U. Wybraniec-Skardowska / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (2004) 243–266 251
theorem holds true in the generalized consequence theory:
T2. x∈Cn{y}⇔y∈Cn−1{x}⇔ x∈Cn+1{y}.
The theorem implies that the acceptance of a proposition as true on the basis of
accepting another proposition as true is the inverse of rejecting the latter proposition
on the basis of rejecting the former.
The rejection procedure usually involves rejection on the basis of a single proposition
(since rejection on the basis of a 0nite number of sequences reduces to rejection on
the basis of their disjunction). However, a more general notion of rejection on the
basis of a 0nite number of propositions can be conceived. Such a generalization has
been introduced by WKojcicki [34] within the theory T , namely, the operation Cn−,
called the dual consequence corresponding to Cn (or to Cn+, if Cn is considered as
infallible). The de0nition of WKojcicki’s operation within T is as follows:
DC−n . Cn
−X = {y | ∃Y ∈FinX (⋂ {Cn{x} | x∈Y}⊆Cn{y})}.
According to DCn−, a proposition is rejected on the basis of propositions in a set
X if and only if the set of its consequences includes the product of the consequences
of propositions in some 0nite subset of X .
WKojcicki proved [34] that
MTw5. The operation Cn− satis9es the general axioms A1–A5 of the consequence
theory T .
Thus WKojcicki’s operation Cn− is a 0nitistic consequence, but not a unit consequence
like the consequence Cn−1. Nevertheless, it satis0es all the intuitions related to the
rejection consequence Cn−1. It is stronger than Cn−1 (in the sense of lattice theory).
The operations Cn−1 and Cn− coincide on unit sets, since the following analogue of
theorem T2 holds:
T3. x∈Cn{y}⇔y∈Cn−{x}⇔y∈Cn−1{x}.
To summarize, it can be said that Tarski’s theory T , extended by the de0nitions
of dual and rejection consequences, yields a double formalization of the theory of
deductive systems, featuring two aspects. Deductive systems described by this theory
are characterized by one of the two dual sets of notions, either of type (+;−) or of
type (−;+). In the sequel we shall use the system (+;−), and after Tarski we shall
consider the consequence Cn as infallible. Thus we assume that Cn = Cn+.
Observe, too, that the consequences Cn+ and Cn+1 as well as Cn− and Cn−1 can be
used to investigate the truth content (asserted as true, correspondingly) and the falsity
content (rejected, correspondingly) of a given theory. This was proved by WoleKnski
[33] in relation to Poper’s idea on the comparison of scienti0c theories.
2.3.3. Notions dual to the syntactic notions of the theory T
The double characteristic of a deductive system through the set of notions
〈S; Cn+; Cn−〉
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enables a further extension of Tarski’s theory T . Within the generalized consequence
theory we can use the dual consequence, or the rejection consequence, to de0ne all the
dual analogues of the basic syntactic notions of the general theory of deductive systems
T . The de0nitions of the dual notions can be derived from the de0nitions D1–D8 by
substituting Cn−1 or Cn− for Cn or Cn+ on their right-hand sides. For instance, the
notions that correspond to
system; consistent set; complete set
are, respectively, the following dual notions:
system with respect to rejection; consistent set with respect to rejection;
complete set with respect to rejection:
The generalized consequence theory admits de0nitions of the basic notions used by
 Lukasiewicz and S lupecki in their pioneering investigations on the so-called saturation
of a deductive system, also called decidability by  Lukasiewicz and  L-decidability of
the system by S lupecki. The formal de0nitions of these notions, used informally by
 Lukasiewicz, were introduced by S lupecki (see [24]):
〈X; Y 〉 ∈  L-Syst⇔X ∈ Syst & Y ∈ Syst−,
〈X; Y 〉 ∈  L-Cons⇔Cn+X ∩ Cn−1Y = ∅,
〈X; Y 〉 ∈  L-Comp⇔Cn+X ∪ Cn−1Y = S,
〈X; Y 〉 ∈  L-Dec⇔〈X; Y 〉 ∈  L-Cons ∩  L-Comp.
According to the 0rst de0nition, an ordered pair of sets is a system in the sense of
 Lukasiewicz, if the 0rst set is a system in the usual sense and the other is a system
with respect to rejection. According to the second de0nition, an ordered pair of sets is
consistent in the sense of  Lukasiewicz, if no proposition can simultaneously be a usual
consequence of the 0rst set and rejected on the basis of propositions of the second.
According to third de0nition, such a pair is complete in the sense of  Lukasiewicz,
if any proposition is either a usual consequence of the 0rst set or rejected on the
basis of propositions of the second. The last de0nition states that a pair of sets is
decidable in the sense of  Lukasiewicz if it is both consistent and complete in the sense
of  Lukasiewicz.
The following metatheorem formulated by S lupecki [23] describes the relation be-
tween  L-decidability and decidability in the usual sense (see [9,2]):
If both the set of all assertions of an axiomatic system with respect to inference
rules (acceptance) and the set of all assertions of an axiomatic system with respect
to rejection rules are recursively enumerable, then  L-decidability of this pair of sets
implies their decidability in the usual sense.
Nowadays it is a common methodological principle to investigate  L-decidability of
speci0c deductive systems (see [5,42,21]). In particular, all the signi0cant propositional
calculi have been tested for  L-decidability.
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3. Axiomatic systems for richer theories of deductive systems
3.1. Deductive system theories based on some propositional calculi
Tarski’s theory T interpreted as a general consequence theory applies to arbitrary
deductive systems. Richer deductive-system theories, extended over T apply only to
systems based on a logic (propositional calculus).
The symbol ′CnX ′ should then be intuitively understood as the consequence set
Cn+X = CnAX , i.e., the set of consequences of X with respect to A (which usually is
the set of axioms for the propositional calculus) and logical proof rules. For an adequate
choice of logical axioms, the modus ponens rule ro can be taken as the only rule of
inference. Hence the set Cn+X can be intuitively understood as the least set containing
A ∪ X and closed with respect to modus ponens, whereas the set Cn+∅ would be the
set of all substitutions of logical laws of this calculus. When a deductive-system theory
is based on some propositional calculus, it contains besides notions corresponding to
the system
〈S; Cn+〉 or 〈S; Cn+; Cn−〉
as many new primitive notions as there are in the logical calculus on which the de-
ductive system described by the richer theory is based. Thus if to the primitive notions
of a propositional calculus are the corresponding symbols of the system:
⇒;∼;∧;∨; F;→;
representing the propositional connectives, respectively: implication, negation, conjunc-
tion, disjunction, falsum, strict implication, necessity, then to the primitive notions of
the deductive-system theory based on this calculus are their metalogical counterparts:
c; n; k; a; f ; c; l
characterized by speci9c axioms of the theory.
Speci0c axioms of any such theory must be added so as to ensure their adequacy
with respect to the calculus on which the theory is based.
Let LC denote the set of all counterparts (called S-substitutions) of the laws of the
calculus C which the theory is based on. We shall then say that
Def(adequacy). A system of speci0c axioms for a theory TC based on some proposi-
tional calculus C is adequate with respect to this calculus if and only if the following
conditions hold:
(a) The expression ′LC ⊆ Cn+∅′ is a theorem of the theory TC ,
(b) If the expression ′&∈Cn+∅′ is a theorem of the theory TC , then &∈LC .
Theories of deductive systems based on classical propositional calculi with diOerent
axiom systems are called classical deductive-system theories. They are theories of
classical consequence. Such theories with adequate axiom systems are represented in
Table 1, while theories based on nonclassical propositional calculi, i.e., theories of
nonclassical consequences, are characterized in Tables 2–4 (cf. [19,20]). The tables
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Table 1
Classical consequences theories
Characterization of the classical propositional calculus
C⇒;∼ C⇒;∼;∨;∧ C⇒; F C⇒
PT ⇒∼ ⇒; ∼; ∨∧ ⇒; F ⇒
PR rs; ro rs; ro rs; ro rs; ro
Ax.  Lukasiewicz’s axiom system C1+: [p⇒ (q⇒ r]⇒ Peirce’s axiom system Taraki-Bernays’s axiom system
 L1+: (p⇒ q)⇒ [(q⇒ r)⇒ (p⇒ r)] [(p⇒ q)⇒ (p⇒ r)] C1f: (p⇒ q)⇒ [(p⇒ r)⇒ (p⇒ r)] C1⇒: (p⇒ q)⇒ [(q⇒ r)
⇒ (p⇒ r)]
 L2+: (∼p⇒p)⇒p C2+: p⇒ (q⇒p) C2f: p⇒ (q⇒p) C2⇒: p⇒ (q⇒p)
 L3+: p⇒ (∼p⇒ q) C3+: p⇒ (q⇒p∧ q) C3f: [(p⇒ q)⇒p]⇒p C3⇒: [(p⇒ q)⇒p]⇒p
C4+: p∧p⇒p C4f F⇒p
C5+: p∧ q⇒ q
C6+: p⇒p∨ q
C7+: q⇒p∨ q D∼: ∼p =df p⇒F
C8+: (p⇒ r)⇒
[(q⇒ r)⇒ (p∨ q⇒ r)]
C9+: (p⇒ q)⇒
[(p⇒∼ q)⇒∼p]
C10+: ∼p⇒ (p⇒ q)
C11+: ∼∼p⇒p
Characterization of deductive system theories based on the classical propositional calculus
T+ T+′ Tf Tc
PT S; Cn+; c; n S; Cn+; c; n; k; a S; Cn+; c; f S; Cn+; c
Ax. A1: card(S)6ℵ0 A1–A5 A1–A5 A1–A5
A2: X ⊆Cn+X ⊆ S
A3: Cn+Cn+X =Cn+X
A4: X ⊆ Y ⇒Cn+X ⊆Cn+Y
A5: Cn+X ⊆ ⋃{Cn+Y | Y ∈Fin(X )}
A6+: cxy; nx∈ S A′6+: cxy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S A6f: cxy; f∈ S A6c: cxy∈ S
A7+: cxy∈Cn+X⇔y∈Cn+(X ∪ {x}) A7+: cxy∈Cn+X⇔y∈Cn+(X ∪ {x}) A7f: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪ {x}) A7c: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔
y∈Cn+(X ∪ {x})
A8+: Cn+{x; nx}= S A8+: Cn+{x; nx}= S A8f: Cn+{f}= S
A9+: Cn+{x} ∩ Cn+{nx}=Cn+∅ A9+: Cn+{x} ∩ Cn+{nx}=Cn+∅ A9f: Cn+{x} ∩ Cn+{cxy}=Cn+∅ A8c: Cn+{x} ∩ Cn+{cxy}=Cn+∅
A10+: Cn+{kxy}=Cn+{x; y}
Dk. kxy =df ncxny A11+: Cn+(X ∪ {axy}) = Dn. nx =df cxf
Cn+(X ∪ {x}) ∩ Cn+(X ∪ {y})
Da. axy =df cnxy
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Table 2
Theories of deductive systems based on the Intuitionistic, minimal, positive propositional calculus
Characterization of the intuitionistic, minimal, positive propositional calculus
C⇒ ;∼ ;∧ ;∨ CI CM CP
PT ⇒; ∼ ; ∧ ;∨ ⇒; ∼ ; ∧ ;∨ ⇒; ∼ ; ∧ ;∨ ⇒
PR rs; ro rs; ro rs; ro rs; ro
Ax. C1: [p⇒ (q⇒ r)]⇒ C1: [p⇒ (q⇒ r)]⇒ C1: [p⇒ (q⇒ r)]⇒ C1P: (p⇒ q)⇒
[(p⇒ q)⇒ (p⇒ r)] [(p⇒ q)⇒ (p⇒ r)] [(p⇒ q)⇒ (p⇒ r)] [(q⇒ r)⇒ (p⇒ r)]
C2: p⇒ (q⇒p) C2: p⇒ (q⇒p) C2: p⇒ (q⇒p) C2P: p⇒ (q⇒p)
C3: p⇒ (q⇒p∧ q) C3: p⇒ (q⇒p∧ q) C3: p⇒ (q⇒p∧ q) C3P: [p⇒ (p⇒ q)]⇒
C4: p∧ q⇒p C4: p∧ q⇒p C4: p∧ q⇒p (p⇒ q)
C5: p∧ q⇒ q C5: p∧ q⇒ q C5: p∧ q⇒ q
C6: p⇒p∨ q C6: p⇒p∨ q C6: p⇒p∨ q Formulas C1P − C3P
C7: q⇒p∨ q C7: q⇒p∨ q C7: q⇒p∨ q can be replaced by
C8: (p⇒ r)⇒ C8: (p⇒ r)⇒ C8: (p⇒ r)⇒ the formulas C1, C2
[(q⇒ r)⇒ (p∨ q⇒ r)] [(q⇒ r)⇒ (p∨ q⇒ r)] [(q⇒ r)⇒ (p∨ q⇒ r)]
C9: (p⇒ q)⇒ [(p⇒ ∼ q)⇒ ∼p] C9: (p⇒ q)⇒ [(p⇒ ∼ q)⇒ ∼p] C9: (p⇒ q)⇒ [(p⇒ ∼ q)⇒ ∼p]
C10: ∼p⇒ (p⇒ q) C10: ∼p⇒ (p⇒ q)
C11: ∼ ∼p⇒p
Characterization of theories of deductive systems based on the propositional calculus: CI ; CM ; CP
T+′′ T I TM TP
PT S; Cn+, c, n, k, a S; Cn+, c, n, k, a S; Cn+, c, n, k, a S; Cn+, c
Ax. A1–A5 A1–A5 A1–A5 A1–A5
A′6+: cxy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S A6I : cxy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S A6M : cxy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S A6P: cxy∈ S
A′7+: cxy∈Cn+X⇔ A7I : cxy∈Cn+X⇔ A7M : cxy∈Cn+X⇔ A7P: cxy∈Cn+X⇔
y∈Cn+(X ∪{x}) y∈Cn+(X ∪{x}) y∈Cn+(X ∪{x}) y∈Cn+(X ∪{x})
A′8+: nx∈Cn+X⇔ A8I : nx∈Cn+X⇔ A8M : ny∈Cn+(X ∪{x})⇒
Cn+(X ∪{x}) = S Cn+(X ∪{x}) = S nx∈Cn+(X ∪{y})
A′10+: kxy∈Cn+X⇔ A9I : kxy∈Cn+X⇔ A9M : kxy∈Cn+X⇔
x; y∈Cn+X x; y∈Cn+X x; y∈Cn+X
A′11+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{y}=Cn+{axy} A10I : Cn+{x}∩Cn+{y}=Cn+{axy} A10M : Cn+{x}∩Cn+{y}=Cn+{axy}
A′9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{cxnx}=Cn+∅
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Table 3
Deductive system theories based on three-valued propositional calculi
Characterization of three-valued propositional calculi
C  L CP3 CM3
Tp ⇒;∼ ⇒;∼; T ⇒;∼;∧;∨
⇒ 0 1=2 1
0 1 1 1
1=2 1=2 1 1
∗1 0 1=2 1
⇒ 0 1=2 1
0 1 1 1
1=2 1=2 1 1
∗1 0 1=2 1
p ∼p
0 1
1=2 1=2
∗1 0
⇒ 0 1=2 1
0 1 1 1
1=2 1 1 1
∗1 0 1=2 1
p ∼p
0 1
1=2 0
∗1 0
Mp
p ∼p
0 1
1=2 1=2
∗1 0
p Tp
0 1=2
1=2 1=2
∗1 1=2
∧ 0 1=2 1
0 0 0 0
1=2 0 1=2 1=2
∗1 0 1=2 1
∨ 0 1=2 1
0 0 1=2 1
1=2 1=2 1=2 1
∗1 1 1 1
Characterization of deductive system theories based on three-valued propositional calculi
T  L3 TP3 TM3
Tp S, Cn, c, n S, Cn, c, n, t S, Cn, c, n, k, a
Ax. A1–A5 A1–A5 A1–A5
A6 L3. cxy, nx∈ S A6P3. cxy, nx, tx∈ S A6M3. cxy, nx, kxy, axy∈ S
A7 L3. A7P3. A7M3 cxy∈CnX ⇔ y∈Cn(X ∪{x})
a. x =∈X ⇒ [cxy∈CnX ⇒ y∈Cn(X ∪{x})] a. x =∈X ⇒ [cxy∈CnX ⇒ y∈Cn(X ∪{x})]
b. y∈Cn(X ∪{x})⇒ cxy∈CnX b. y∈Cn(X ∪{x})⇒ cxy∈CnX
A8 L3. nx =∈X ⇒ [nx∈Cn(X ∪{x}⇒ A8P3. nx =∈X ⇒ [nx∈Cn(X ∪{x})⇒ A8M3. nx∈CnX ⇔Cn(X ∪{x}) = S
y∈Cn(X ∪{x})] y∈Cn(X ∪{x})]
A9 L3. Cn{x}∩Cn{cxnx}=Cn∅ A9P3. Cn{x}∩Cn{cxnx}=Cn∅ A9M3. x; y∈CnX ⇔ kxy∈CnX
A10P3. tx∈CnX ⇔ ntx∈CnX A10M3. Cn{x}∩Cn{y}=Cn{axy}
A11M3. Cn{x}∩Cn{nx}∩Cn{cxy}
=Cn∅
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Table 4
Deductive system theories based on modal logics
Characterization of Lewis’s system S’5 and G@odel’s system G5
S’5 G5
PT →; ∼∧ ⇒; ∼ ;
PR rs; ro rs; ro
Ax S15. q→ (p→ q) G15. (p⇒ q)⇒ [(q⇒ r)⇒ (p⇒ r)]
S25. {(p→ q)→ r)→ (p→ q)}→ (p→ q) G25. (∼p⇒p)⇒p
S35. (p→ q)→ [(q→ r)→ (p→ r)] G35. p⇒ (∼p⇒ q)
S45. p∧ q→p G45. p⇒p
S55. p∧ q→ q G55. (p⇒ q)⇒ ( p⇒ q)
S65. (p→ q)→ [(p→ r) → (p→ q∧ r)] G65. ∼p⇒ ∼ p
S75. (p→ q)→ (∼ q→∼p)
S85. p→∼∼p
S95. ∼∼p→p
S105. p∧∼ (p∧∼ q)→ q
Characterization of deductive system theories based on S5 i G5
TS5 TG5
PT S, Cn, c, n, k S, Cn, c, n, l
Ax. A1–A5 A1–A5
A65. cxy, kxy, nx∈ S A66. cxy, nx, lx∈ S
A75. A76. cxy∈CnX ⇔ y∈Cn(X ∪{x})
a. cxy∈CnX → y∈Cn(X ∪{x})
b. X ∈ S∗⇒ [y∈Cn(X ∪{x})⇒ cxy∈CnX ]
A85. Cn{x; nx}= S A86. Cn{x; nx}= S
A95. x∈ S∗→Cn{x}∩Cn{cxy}=Cn∅ A96. Cn{x}∩Cn{nx}=Cn∅
A105. kxy∈CnX ⇔ x; y∈CnX A106. X ⊆ S∗1 ⇒ (lx∈CnX ⇔ x∈CnX )
A115. Cn(X ∪{nx}) = S⇒ x∈CnX
x∈ S∗⇔∃ y, z (x = cyz) x∈ S∗1 ⇔∃ y(x = ly∨ x = nly)
clearly show various comparable features of diOerent theories. The presentation of the
tables includes the contribution of Ms. Krystyna Krala, master student of the author of
this paper.
3.2. Classical consequence theories and equivalent theories
In this part of the paper we present the axioms of the original so-called Tarski’s
enriched deductive system theory, which we denote by T+. We also show several
theories equivalent to T+, including theories with unit consequences or consequences
dual to the classical one as primitive notions.
3.2.1. Tarski’s theory T+ and its equivalent modi9cations
Tarski’s theory T+ (see [30]) is a deductive system theory based on the implicational-
negational propositional calculus C⇒;∼ (e.g. the  Lukasiewicz calculus). It is a clas-
sical consequence theory. It has an adequate speci0c axiom system that characterizes the
usual consequence operation using the counterparts of the classical con-
nectives of implication and negation, i.e., using metalinguistic connectives c and n.
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Such theories are related to some classical consequence theories for deductive systems
based on other classical propositional calculi. Table 1 characterizes the following theo-
ries and classical propositional calculi, which the theories are based on: the theory T+
based on  Lukasiewicz’s C⇒;∼ calculus, the theory T+′ based on the classical propo-
sitional calculus C⇒;∼;∧;∨ with implication, negation, conjunction and disjunction as
primitive notions, the theory T f based on the classical propositional calculus with
implication and falsum as primitive notions, and the theory T c based on the two-valued
implicational propositional calculus C⇒. The symbols PT, PR and Ax occurring in
Table 1 represent, correspondingly, the primitive notions of a calculus or theory, prim-
itive inference rules of the propositional calculus, i.e., the substitution rule rs and the
modus ponens ro, and the axiom system of the calculus or the theory based on it.
All these theories, built over Tarski’s general consequence theory, assume the axioms
A1–A5. The consequence operation Cn+ and the primitive notions of a theory are
described through speci0c axioms. In each case the sixth axiom states that the set S
of all the propositions in the language of the corresponding deductive system based
on some given propositional calculus is closed under implication and, correspondingly,
negation or falsum, or negation, conjunction and disjunction. For each of the classical
consequence theories represented in Table 1 the seventh axiom is a conjunction of a
direct and an inverse implication. The direct implication states that if an implication
in the language of the deductive system considered is a consequence of some set of
expressions, then its consequent is a consequence of the same set enriched by the an-
tecedent of the implication. Thus the direct implication in the seventh axiom is some
sort of modus ponens. In turn, the inverse implication is a form of deduction theorem.
The eighth axiom of the theories T+ and T+′ states that the consequence set of a
pair of contradictory propositions is the set S of all the propositions of the deductive
system. In other words, it declares that any proposition of the system can be deduced
from two contradictory propositions. In the theory T f this axiom is replaced by the
statement that the set S is the consequence set of the falsum. If the set Cn+∅ is inter-
preted as the set of logical laws of the system, the ninth axiom of the theories T+ and
T+′ states that an expression is a law of the system if and only if it is a consequence
of both a proposition x and its negation nx. In the theories T f and T c this axiom is
replaced by the statement that an expression is a law of the system if and only if it is a
consequence of both a proposition x and any implication with the proposition x in the
antecedent. The theory T+′ includes two more axioms on conjunction and disjunction.
The set of consequences of a conjunction of two propositions consists exactly of those
propositions that are consequences of both of them, whereas the set of consequences
of some set X and a disjunction is the intersection of two consequence sets: of the
set X together with the 0rst proposition of the disjunction and the set X with the
second proposition in the disjunction. The theories T+′ and T f are just modi0cations
of Tarski’s theory T+ and are equivalent to the latter. Table A shows their features.
Many theories equivalent to Tarski’s original enriched deductive-system theory T+
concerning the classical consequence Cn+ have been constructed. Equivalent theo-
ries have the good property that each of them contains the axioms and de0nitions
of the other among its theorems. By extending the axiom sets of each the theories
T+; T+′; T+′ and T f by de0nitions of terms which do not occur in them, but occur in
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Table A
Classical consequence theories
Theory T+ Theory T f
PT S; Cn+, c, n S; Cn+, c, f
Ax A1–A5 A1–A5
A6+: cxy; nx∈ S A6+: cxy; f ∈ S
A7+: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪{x}) A7+: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪{x})
A8+: Cn+{x; nx}= S A8+: Cn+{f}= S
A9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{nx}=Cn+∅ A9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{cxy}=Cn+∅
Df : f=df ncxx Dn: nx=df cxf
Theory T+ Theory T+′
PT S; Cn+, c, n S; Cn+, c, n, k, a
Ax A1–A5 A1–A5
A6+: cxy; nx∈ S A′6+: cxy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S
A7+: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪{x}) A7+: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪{x})
A8+: Cn+{x; nx}= S A8+: Cn+{x; nx}= S
A9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{nx}=Cn+∅ A9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{nx}=Cn+∅
Dk: kxy=df ncxny A10+: Cn+{kxy}=Cn+{x; y}
Da: axy=df cnxy A11+: Cn+(X ∪{axy})=
Cn+(X ∪{x})∩Cn+(X ∪{y})
Theory T c Theory T+′′
PT S; Cn+, c S; Cn+, c, n, k, a
Ax A1–A5 A1–A5, A′6+;A7+
A6c: cxy∈ S
A7+: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪{x})
A8c: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{cxy}=Cn+∅ A′8+: nx∈Cn+X ⇔Cn(X ∪{x}) = S
A′9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{cxnx}=Cn+∅
A′10+: kxy∈Cn+X ⇔ x; y∈Cn+X
A′11+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{y}=Cn+{axy}
the other theories, it can be proved that all these classical consequence theories are
equivalent. The theory T+′′ characterized in Table A has an axiom system designed
so as to enable investigation of relations among deductive system theories based on
nonclassical propositional calculi. Some of these relations are shown in Tables 2–4.
It is also easily seen that the theory T c, based on a two-valued implicational propo-
sitional calculus and shown in Table A, is just a part of each of the classical conse-
quence theories distinguished here. Observe that such basic syntactic notions as consis-
tency and completeness can be de0ned in each of the equivalent classical consequence
theories mentioned above by using the term ′n′, and therefore diOerently from the
theory T .
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3.2.2. Dual theories equivalent to the theory T+
We shall indicate some theories that are both equivalent and dual to the theory T+,
and thus are also dual to its equivalent versions. In the Table B below we compare
the classical consequence theory T+′ with its dual theory T− of the dual consequence.
The dual theories T+′ and T−—presented in Table B are based on one of the
following sets of dual notions, correspondingly:
S; Cn+; c; n; k; a
and
S; Cn−; c−; n; k; a;
where Cn+ is the usual classical consequence, whereas Cn− is the 0nitistic rejection
consequence, c is the usual classical implication, and c− is the implication dual to
the implication c, de0ned within the theory T+′ through de0nition Dc− (see Table B).
The implication c−xy bears the following intuition: it is true in one and only one
case, when both nx and y are true propositions, i.e., when x is a false proposition and
y is a true proposition. The intuition behind the dual implication is the rejection of
propositions according to the rejection modus ponens rule r−o , dual to the usual modus
ponens r+o . By comparing the two rules:
Modus ponens Rejection modus ponens
 cxy  c−xy
r+0 :  x r−0 :  x—— ———
 x  y
it can be seen that while the usual modus ponens yields the proposition y as an assertion
of the system (accepts it as a true proposition) on the basis of two assertions (two
propositions accepted as true) of which one is a usual implication cxy and the other
is its antecedent x, the rejection modus ponens rejects a system proposition y (rejects
it as a false proposition) on the basis of two rejected propositions of the system: the
dual implication c−xy and its antecedent x.
The axiom system for WKojcicki’s dual consequence theory T− shown in Table B
is based on an approach by Spasowski [27]. The speci0c axioms 6-9 of both the
theories T+′ and T− are analogous, dual. While the direct implication following from
axiom A7+ of the theory T+′ is a counterpart for the modus ponens rule r+o , the
direct implication following from axiom A7− of the theory T− is a counterpart for
the rejection modus ponens rule r−o . Because the dual counterpart for conjunction is
the disjunction and vice versa, axiom 10 of the theory T+′ states, for instance, that the
consequence of a conjunction of two propositions (or of a 0nite number of propositions)
is the consequence of the component propositions, whereas the axiom A11− of the
theory T− states that the proposition rejected on the basis of two propositions (or of
a 0nite number of them) is rejected on the basis of their disjunction.
Another theory dual to the theory T+′ of the classical consequence Cn+ is the theory
T−1 of the rejection consequence Cn−1. It is equivalent to the theory T+′ and thus
U. Wybraniec-Skardowska / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (2004) 243–266 261
Table B
Dual 0nitistic consequence theories
Theory T+′ Theory T−
PT S; Cn+, c, n, k, a S; Cn−; c−, n, a, k
Ax. A1–A5 A1–A5
A′6+: cxy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S A′6−: c−xy; nx; kxy; axy∈ S
A7+: cxy∈Cn+X ⇔ y∈Cn+(X ∪{x}) A7−: c−xy∈Cn−X ⇔ y∈Cn−(X ∪{x})
A8+: Cn+{x; nx}= S A8−: Cn−{x; nx}= S
A9+: Cn+{x}∩Cn+{nx}=Cn+∅ A9−: Cn−{x}∩Cn−{nx}=Cn−∅
A10+: Cn+{kxy}=Cn+{x; y} A10−: Cn−(X ∪{kxy})=
Cn−(X ∪{x})∩Cn−(X ∪{y})
A11+: Cn+(X ∪{axy})= A11−: Cn−{axy}) =Cn−{x; y}
Cn+(X ∪{x})∩Cn+(X ∪{y})
Dc−: c−xy=df ncyx Dc: cxy=df nc−yx
DCn−. WKojcicki’s de0nition of dual cons. DCn+. WKojcicki’s de0nition of dual cons.
induced by the cons. operation Cn+ induced by the cons. operation Cn−
Table C
Dual unit consequence theories
Theory T+1 Theory T−1
PT S; Cn+1, c, n, k S; Cn−1, c, n, k
Ax. A1+1: card(S)6ℵo A1−1: card(S)6ℵo
A2+1: nx; cxy∈ S A2−1: nx; cxy∈ S
A3+1: y∈Cn+1X ⇔ A3−1: y∈Cn−1X ⇔
∃x∈X (Cn+1{y}⊆Cn+1{x}) ∃x∈X (Cn−1{y}⊆Cn−1{x})
A4+1: KCn+1KX ⊆Cn+1KX A4−1: y∈Cn−1{cxy}
A5+1: cxy∈Cn+1X⇒ A5−1: x∈Cn−1{y}⇔Cn−1{cxy}= S
y∈Cn+1K(X ∪{x})
A6+1: y∈Cn+1(X ∪{x})⇒ A6−1: x1 ∈Cn−1{y1}∧ x2 ∈Cn−1{y2}⇒
cxy∈Cn+1(KX ∪{cxx}) k(x1; x2)∈Cn−1{ky1y2}
A7+1: Cn+1{x}∩Cn+1{nx}=Cn+1{cxx} A7−1: Cn−1{ckxyz}=Cn−1{kcxcyz}
A8+1: Cn+1{kxnx}= S A8−1: kxnx∈Cn−1{y}
A9−1: x; nx∈Cn−1{y}⇒Cn−1{y}= S
A10−1. a. kxy∼ kyx
b: kkxyz∼ kxkyz
c: y∼ z⇒ kxy∼ kxz
d: kxx∼ x
DCn−1: y∈Cn−1X ⇔∃x∈X (x∈Cn+1{y}) DCn−1: y∈Cn+1X ⇔∃x∈X (y∈Cn1{x})
KX -set of all conjunctions of propositions in X
D∼: x∼ y⇔∀z(x∈Cn−1{z}⇔ y∈Cn−1{z})
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also to the theory T+ (see [35]). The rejection of the propositions is in fact reduced
to the rejection on the basis of a single proposition, and Cn−1 is a unit consequence.
The theory T−1 can be coupled with its dual, the theory T+1 of the unit consequence
Cn+1 corresponding to the classical consequence Cn+. The theory T+′ is equivalent to
the theory T+1 (see [26]), and thus the theories T+1 and T−1 are dual theories of unit
consequences equivalent to each other. The axioms and de0nitions of these, theories
have been assembled in Table C.
The only diOerence between the systems of primitive notions of the two theories
consists in substituting the notion of unit consequence Cn+1 of T+1 for the notion
of rejection consequence Cn−1 in T−1. The third axioms of both theories ensure that
the operations Cn+1 and Cn−1 are unit consequences (see Ax1). The axioms that
characterize the functors of implication, negation and conjunction are very simple; the
disjunction of propositions is de0ned classically. The term ′KX ′ appearing in the axioms
of the theory T+1 represents the set of all the conjunctions formed of propositions in
X . The term ′∼′, appearing in the axiom A10−1 of the theory T−1, represents the
equivalence relation for propositions de0ned as follows: two propositions x and y are
equivalent (in symbols, x∼y) if and only if both are rejected on the basis of the same
propositions.
3.2.3. Contradiction theory equivalent to T+
Tarski’s enriched deductive-system theory T+ is often said to be a theory of deduc-
tion and contradiction. The notion of contradiction is de0ned as in Tarski’s general
consequence theory T (see 2.2 D7), or with the use of negation.
It may be interesting to note that for the theory T+, meant to formalize the notion of
classical consequence Cn+ (notion of entailment), there is a corresponding equivalent
theory of contradiction (see [36]).
Besides the terms ′S ′, ′n′ and ′c′, the theory of contradiction contains a new primitive
term ‘Incons’, representing the family of all contradictory sets.
Here are the axioms of this theory:
A1′. card(S)6ℵo,
A2′. Incons⊆P(S),
A3′. X ⊆Y ∧X ∈ Incons⇒Y ∈ Incons,
A4′. X ∈ Incons⇒∃Y ∈FinX (Y ∈ Incons),
A5′. x; cxy∈ S,
A6′. X ∪{x}, X ∪{nx}∈ Incons⇒X ∈ Incons,
A7′. {x; nx}∈ Incons,
A8′. X ∪{x; ny}∈ Incons⇔X ∪{ncxy}∈ Incons.
The axioms characterizing the family Incons state the following: this is a subfamily
of the family of all subsets of the proposition set S (A2′); a superset of a contra-
dictory set is a contradictory set itself (A3′); every contradictory set contains a 0nite
contradictory subset (A4′); if by adding a proposition to a set X and then adding to
X the negation of the same proposition two contradictory sets arise, then the set X is
itself contradictory (A6′); the set consisting of two contradictory propositions is con-
tradictory (A7′); the set obtained from some set X by adding to it a proposition x and
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the negation of a proposition y is contradictory if and only if X with an added the
negation of implication with antecedent x and consequent y is contradictory (A8′).
In the contradiction theory we consider here, the de0nition of the consequence Cn+
is as follows:
DCn+. x∈Cn+X ⇔X ∪{nx}∈ Incons.
It states that a proposition is a consequence of (follows from) some set X of propo-
sitions if and only if adding the negation of this proposition to X yields a contradictory
set.
As was mentioned before, the de0nition of the family Incons in the theory T+ is
the following:
DIncons. X ∈ Incons⇔Cn+X = S.
3.3. Deductive system theories based on nonclassical propositional calculi
The axiom systems of various theories presented up to now show a strong relation
to Tarski’s more general and enriched consequence theory, and thus also to the axiom-
atization of the classical consequence notion. However, there are also many theories of
nonclassical consequence, i.e., theories describing the properties of deductive systems
based on nonclassical propositional calculi. We assemble and compare them between
them or with the classical consequence theory T+′′—in Tables 2–4.
Axiom systems for several theories presented in Table 2 appear in the joint papers by
Pogorzelski and S lupecki [19,20]. Table 2 characterizes the following theories and their
corresponding propositional calculi: the theory T+′′ based on the classical propositional
calculus with implication, negation, conjunction and disjunction, the theory T I based
on the intuitionistic propositional calculus CI , the theory TM based on Johannson’s
minimal propositional calculus CM , and the theory TP based on the positive proposi-
tional calculus CP .
Table 3 features three theories based on well-known three-valued propositional calculi
constructed by the matrix method:  Lukasiewicz’s calculus C  L3; the full propositional
calculus CP3 with S lupecki’s functor T ; a calculus CM3 with implication, negation,
disjunction and conjunction, that contains the intuitionistic calculus and is contained in
the two-valued calculus.
Table 4 contains axiom systems for deductive system theories based on two modal
logics: a modi0cation S’5 of Lewis’s calculus S5 and GUodel’s calculus G5.
The axioms systems for deductive-system theories based on nonclassical logics are
adequate with respect to these calculi. They characterize deductive systems as a pair
of the form
〈S; Cn+〉;
where Cn+ =Cn. I know of no formalization of deductive systems based on non-
classical logics that would also comprise properties of consequences dual to the con-
sequence Cn+.
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4. Final remarks
Following Tarski’s ideas, we have considered here some meta-metamathematical or
meta-metalogical research related to the formalization of deductive system theories,
mainly to the formalization of their syntax.
Observe that
The systems considered here could be characterized in two aspects: both as systems
with respect to acceptance and systems with respect to rejection.
Both the method of characterizing speci0c logical systems and the method of investi-
gating their saturation, i.e., their  L-decidability, have been initiated by  Lukasiewicz and
developed by S lupecki. Nowadays they are commonly used methodological procedures.
Note then that
The axiomatization of metamathematics, initiated by Tarski, is more general.
Indeed, it applies to the formalization of deductive system theories both with respect
to acceptance and with respect to rejection.
The problem of formalizing the entire methodology of science including the method-
ology of empirical sciences also arises. Some attempts at the formalization of some
methodological questions of empirical sciences were undertaken on the initiative of
Jerzy S lupecki in Ph.D. Theses of his students: Wybraniec-Skardowska and Bryll (see
[35,4,25]).
A more general approach to the formalization of the methodology of
science as a general theory of scienti0c expressions (not necessarily of a deduc-
tive science) and syntactical and semantical relations involving these expressions (see
Carnap [7,8]), hence as a general theory of written signs or texts and a theory
which would allow formalization of adequate, more general notions of usual and dual
consequence, remains an open problem.
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